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INTRODUCTION
Three examples of federal labor legislation provide the 
means to examine the prooess of labor reform through the 
Interaction, broadly, of business, labor and government. The 
Davis-Bacon Aot (1931), the Wagner Aot (1935), and the fair 
Labor Standards Aot (1938) all present the problem of why eaoh 
oould pass within the political context of their specific time 
periods. My purpose Is then to examine each of these bills 
keeping in mind both the problems they had in gaining passage 
and the reasons why these problems never prevented them from 
becoming laws. In doing so, I ask as well the question of why 
the government was even reoeptive to labor legislation: Did
this type of legislation relate to any eoonomio, legal or 
ethical concerns of the government? And in eaoh oase, whioh 
faction of the government was most likely to respond to these 
oonoerns and then push for a bill?
In examining these three laws, I also ask if they as a 
combined study oan show any parallels in the way business, labor 
and government, or different interest groups within these broad 
oategorles, worked for and against labor reform. Do they 
demonstrate a rise or loss in the ability of outside groups to 
influenoe legislative aotion? And if a particular group, suoh 
as organised labor, were to show a gain in power from alignments 
with the government, what influenced their ability? finally, 
after looking at the three prooesses and drawing oonaeotions 
between them, is there a framework or guide that oan help to
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explain how political action shaped this legislation? A 
fraaework not only would help to sharpen the understanding of 
the three laws in this study■ but would serve as a broader guide 
to at least provide a different structure to analyse federal 
labor legislation.
CHAPTER 1
THE DAVIS-BACON ACT
The Davis-Baoon Aot established a prevailing rate of wages 
for laborers and meohanica oontraoted for federal eonstruotion 
work within their localities. The Secretary of Labor determined 
the prevailing wages and also resolved any disputes that might 
have arisen about what the prevailing rate was in a particular 
locality. The purpose of the law was to prevent unscrupulous 
oontraotors from hiring lower paid workers from outside the 
looality and thus underbidding the oontraotors who were paying 
the going rate. Before Davis-Baoon passed, the federal 
government had to acoept the lowest bid on any contraot. 
Davia-Baoon was designed to prevent undercutting the working 
man’s established wages.
Although Davis-Bacon Aot did not cause muoh controversy when 
it passed, it has gained some notoriety in the last fifteen 
years. "Davis-Baoon determinations have tended to raiso wages 
in the construction industry, . . . [to] spread high wages to 
various geographical localities irrespective" of the prevailing 
wage rates; to "discourage or make impossible participation of 
nonunionised construction" on federal projects, and to also have 
"strengthened the position of unionised construction labor"
(1). During the 1970s and 1980s, attempts have been made to 
modify or change the aot, and even recently, the Justice 
Department narrowed the prevailing wage r >quirement on oertain 
federal projects to aooolades from the New York Times and ourses 
from organised labor (2). The prevailing wage law had begun to
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undermine non-union labor because it favored the union soale on 
federal construction. Non-union labor labeled Davis-Bacon 
discriminatory. It also inflated constructions costs and thus 
oost taxpayers more money. The government was required to pay 
the "prevailing" rate, now defined as the union soale, rather 
than out oosts by hiring less expensive non-union labor (3).
The problem of bootleg labor whioh had originally prompted 
Davis-Bacon was no longer an issue; and the oonflict between 
union and non-union wage, which had been irrelevant originally, 
made the bill more trouble than before.
1931 seems like an odd time for such potentially pro-union 
regulation to pass. Labor unions did not yet have the 
legislative support of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(NIRA) or the Wagner Aot to allow for full-fledged aotivism. In 
1931 the labor movement was collapsing under the pressure of the 
depression. Industry leaders were politically and economically 
influential; but why would they, or did they even, lend their 
support to a bill whioh one representative said organised labor 
demanded (4)? And Herbert Hoover's administration, not usually 
recognised for its outstanding strides forward in labor reform, 
aotually took the bill and wrote it so that it would pass in 
1931. The problems Davis-Bacon presents then, are how did a 
weak labor movement push a bill through Congress; why did 
industry not interfere with this pro-labor bill; and why did a 
conservative administration embraoe the bill to make it pass?
Neither pro- nor anti-labor forces rallied around 
Davis-BaoOn. Surprisingly, major national unions did not
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promote the bill until just before it passed. And even more 
shocking! those unions that would seem to have the most to gain 
from Davis-Bacon, suoh as the AFL’s Building Trades Onions, the 
International Brotherhood of Elecrical Workers (IBKW), the 
Carpenters and Joiners, and the Teamsters, had little or nothing 
to do with lobbying or promoting the bill to the government or 
to their own members. Even the leaders of the construction 
industry, who would also have much to gain (or possibly to lose) 
if a prevailing wage law were passed, were extraordinarily 
closed-mouthed. It was difficult to even find those few unions 
or business leaders who cared enough about Davis-Baoon to 
comment on it.
Why then was there not an uproar when the bill was first 
introduced? Why didn't unions embrace it and contractors 
denounce it? To understand the foroes that pushed Davis-Baoon, 
it is best to first look at a brief legislative history of the 
bill, and then to examine the motivations and issues of those 
interest groups involved in the legislative process.
The impetus for the Davis-Baoon Aot was a federal oontraot 
let in 1926 for a Veterans' Bureau Hospital in Northport, Hew 
York to an Alabama contractor. Rep. Robert Bacon, a Hew York 
Republican, was sufficiently motivated to draft a bill that 
would stop underbidding from out-of-state contractors. The 
Baoon bill had short hearings in the Bouse Committee on Labor in 
1927 and another version was stuck in oommittee in a 1928 
session. It was not until the second session of the 71st 
Congress that the bill began to be looked at more seriously when
•5s i A"
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Elliot Sproul, an Illinois Hepublican, reintroduced Bacon’s 
original 1927 bill. The House labor committee hearings in March 
1930 covered all the issues of the bill, and the committee 
reported it favorably.
The Hoover administration then took the bill and revised 
it. Sen. James Davis, who as Hoover's secretary of labor had 
endorsed an earlier version of the bill in 1930, introduced it 
in the Senate; and Bacon reclaimed it in the House. The bill 
was shorter, eliminating a clause that would penalize 
contractors for disobeying the provisions, and streamlined from 
four longer paragraphs to two short ones (5). These changes 
were made to make the bill constitutionally viable as well as to 
satisfy industrial interests tied to the administration.
Hearings were held in the House Committee on Labor and the 
Senate Committee on Manufacturers, both of whioh reported the 
bill favorably. The Senate had a brief debate and passed the 
bill in January 1931. The House debated the bill more 
extensively the next month, and it passed without a roll call. 
Hoover signed the Davis-Bacon bill on Maroh 3, 1931.
Beoauue Davis-Bacon only regulated the construction 
industry, it is vital to look at that industry to understand the 
dynamics of the legislation. The Depression hit construction 
hard, particularly in workers’ wages and in employment.
Builders often deflated wages and lowered rateo just to receive 
a contraot. Workers had no ohoice but to accept lower wages 
since a steady job and some wages were preferable to 
unemployment. Contractors who imported labor were widespread as
well. At the 1927 hearings, Bacon described what originally 
instigated his bill. The workers "were herded onto this job 
[the Northport hospital], they were housed in shacks, they were 
paid a very low wage, and the work proceeded. Of course, that 
meant that the labor conditions in that part of New York State 
where this hospital was to be built were entirely upset. It 
meant that the neighboring community was very much upset" (6).
In the 1930 Hearings, Sproul cites four speoific instances of 
imported labor (7). William Green in his 1931 testimony read a 
report of fifteen instances of imported labor (8). The New York 
Times reported in July 1930 that a Veterans’ Bureau contractor 
in Chicago had been undercutting wages (9). This was not an 
isolated problem. With the onset of the Depression, the 
problems of out-rate contracts and lowered rates could only 
inorease as contractors scrambled for bids and workers scrambled 
for employment.
Contractors tried to maintain their competitive edge, and 
un- or underemployed workers were willing to work for less than 
the prevailing scale. The eoonomic stability of building trade 
wage-earners had been completely undermined as wages were 
squeesed lower and lower. Total new construction dropped about 
26 percent from 1929 to 1930; and in 1931, it fell to just over 
half its level in 1929. Wages reflected this decline in 
construction. In 1932, wages were 33.1 peroent of 1929 wages, 
and by 1933, wages were 24.6 peroent of what they were in 1929 
(10). Although these wage statistics postdate the time when 
Davis-Bacon was introduced and passed, they nevertheless show
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the deterioration of wages in the construction industry.
These economic indicators show the predicament of the 
construction industry in the early 1930s. But they alone do not 
tell anything about why such a bill as Davis-Bacon was passed to 
remedy them. It is also necessary to consider how the three 
players in labor reform law— labor, business and 
government--worked to get this bill passed. Some analyses of 
the law, mostly written as Davis-Bacon reemerged in the 
seventies, suggest that labor was wholly responsible for the 
bill. The support for this contention is that the law gave 
advantages to union labor over nonunion labor; that the problem 
of itinerant labor was overstated; that because the law both 
predated the depression and because it was not a temporary 
measure, the depression did not cause it; and that a raoial bias 
prompted unions to take aotion.
One author, Armand Thieblot, says that, "under a prevailing 
wage law, union ra.es, at least in some areas, would be 
protected from nonunion wage competition" (11). Another 
analysis, written by Elliot Gould and George Bittlingmayer, 
notes that, "by stipulating that the prevailing wage be paid in 
a heavily unionised area, it beoomes muoh less likely that a 
nonunion contractor based outside the area . . . would find it 
profitable to compete there" (12). The bill’s philosophy 
preoeded the depression and massive government construction 
programs. Before the Mew Deal, the building trades had one of 
the strongest unions; and "they had the political strength in 
the legislatures to secure passage of prevailing wage laws to
8
protect the labor standard they had been able to protect" (13). 
That forty-one state laws similar to Davis-Bacon had been passed 
in the past eighty years indicates that "prevailing wage 
legislation was not exclusively a product of the Depression, 
although those circumstanoes appear to have contributed to its 
passage on the federal level" (14).
Some evidence suggests that "the itinerant worker problem 
was not as severe as it was represented” and that workers were 
more often imported to areas with a smaller local labor foroe 
(15). Thieblot refutes "the contention that the Davis-Bacon Act 
was prompted by the depression wage conditions and problems of 
itinerant bootleg labor or contractors [because] Congress 
declined a suggestion that the bill be passed as special 
legislation or as a temporary measure to last only during the 
emergency of the depression" (16). Although "the mounting 
hardships . . . created a olimate in which legislation such as a 
national prevailing wage law oould succeed” (17). Also, these 
authors introduce racism as a motivation for passing this 
law— that northern white workers resented southern blaoks taking 
their jobs for racial reasons.
These writers oorreotly assess a number of aspeots of the 
fight for Davis-Bacon. Their oonolusions, however, are oolored 
with a convenient reoent hindsight whioh allows them to blame 
unions for framing an unfair bill. They both use a quote from 
the single representative who opposed the bill, Henry Blanton, 
to show that labor was forcing the issue to Congress. They 
ignore the almost unanimous support from Congress. Just because
9
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the prevailing wage philosophy predated the Depression does not 
then prove that unions pushed it into the Depression. Certainly 
unions had influence on their state legislatures and helped to 
push bills through. In the 1930 Hearings, Bacon submitted an 
extensive list of state statutes and court citations related to 
states’ labor requirements for their construction projeots
(18) . But unions did not have the same influence on a national 
and federal level as they might have on a state or municipal 
level. The raoism issue the authors introduce oould be 
categorised more correctly as regional or economio tensions not 
inherently racist. The North offered economio opportunity to 
workers that the South simply did not. Thieblot suggests that 
depressed wage conditions were not an issue since Davis-Baoon 
was passed as a temporary measure. But Just beoause the measure 
was not temporary, it does not then follow that the depression 
was not influential in its passage. And the overpriced union 
rate of the 1970s and 1980s was established by determinations of 
the law, not by the provisions of the original law itself
(19) .
From the start of the hearings, labor unions did indeed 
endorse Davis-Baoon, although not as loudly nor as quickly as 
might be expeoted. Labor leaders testified for Davis-Baoon at 
every one of the hearings, including John Gleason of the 
Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers, and AFL representatives such 
as Idgar Wallace; William Spenoer, the aeoretary of the AFL’s 
Building Trades Department; John Frey of the Metal Trades 
Department of the AFL; M.J. MoDonougi.*, president of the Building
11
Trades Department of the AFL; and even, finally, William Oreen, 
the president of the AFL. They had vociferous objections to the 
problems of undercut wages. McDonough best explained how 
contractors who brought their own labor worked to beat the 
system:
The contractor, who evidently comes from the South, 
comes in the locality . . . knowing the soales and 
conditions that prevail in that locality, and he 
figures that job at a few dollars less than the scale 
prevailing in that looality, thereby defeating the fair 
oontraotors in an effort to get suoh work. He is not 
satisfied with that, but brings his men in from the 
South and other localities, and then . . .  he exploits 
them further, for he does not pay the wage he figured 
to pay, but probably pays three or four dollars less 
than he figured to pay, and probably less than the 
contractors in that locality have figured to pay (20).
Three main ideas emerged from these leaders' testimony. They
felt first that the government should not aid in this praotioe,
as Frey said in the 1930 hearings:
We have the speotacle in this country of a method 
under which the Government apparently oan not help 
itself but must be a party to injuring not only the 
labor in the communities where the buildings are going 
up but other oonstruotion work, to the injury of looal 
merchants; likewise in leaving the community with the 
unemployment problem in times like this very greatly 
intensified (21).
The federal government had a responsibility to be a model 
employer, especially in times of economic hardship and 
unemployment. Labor leaders also thought that Davis-Baoon 
would, as McDonough testified, "help the unemployment situation 
that prevails in this oountry today" (22). At the final 
hearings on Davis-Baoon, William Green finally gave the bill the 
AFL's "full and hearty support." He expressed the third oonoern 
of labor, that the bill would stand up as an effeotive pieoe of
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legislation. "It Is very difficult, of oourse to establish a 
fixed-standard wage, but this bill proposes to do the practical 
thing, and that is to accept the prevailing rate of wages in 
that community as the standard rate" (23). The position of the 
union leaders who testified at the hearings was that the 
government should not be a party to exploitation of labor; that 
the bill would reduce some of the problems of unemployment; and 
that it would be a practical law. On the whole, these labor 
leaders did encourage the idea of a bill to establish a 
prevailing rate of wages, and clearly saw an excellent 
opportunity to get a beneficial bill parsed.
These leaders did not, however, extensively promote 
Davis-Bacon in the editorials of their journals or at their 
yearly conventions. They did not make muoh of an attempt to 
bring Davis-Bacon to either their members’ or the public’s 
attention. There was some comment on the progress of the 
prevailing wage bill in trade journals and in convention 
proceedings. Only one labor journal, the Bricklayer. Mason and 
Plasterer Journal, oarefully followed the progress of 
Davis-Baoon. In Maroh 1930 the Journal commented somewhat 
grandiosely that "labor has united in support of the Sproul 
bill, sponsored by our organization" (24). This journal is the 
only one that even mentioned sponsoring the bill. Whether this 
meant they actually worked with Congressmen to frame the bill, 
or whether it was a oall to their members to promote the bill is 
not clear. What is clear is that the Brioklayers was one of the 
only unions to disouss Davis-Baoon in more than a cursory
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manner. The editorial urged members of "the vital necessity for 
continuing the work of informing" Congress of their goals (25).
The bill made it through the committee, even without 
extensive union activism. The Journal reflected the same issues 
other labor representatives presented at the hearings, 
particularly two ideas that the Federal government should be a 
model employer, and that Davis-Bacon would ease some of the 
conditions of unemployment. "The spectacle of wage and working 
standards on Government work, in this critical period of 
unemployment, in the face of White House protests that there 
should be no reduction of wages, is one of the shameful pages of 
current history" (26). Yet in recognising a situation that 
labor "should have plunged into the battle full foroe," support 
from other unions had been "medioore” (27). There wasn’t 
widespread support among unions, and the Brioklayers’ reoognized 
that problem.
Upon the bill’s passage, the Brioklayers eohoed Green’s 
sentiments that the law would not do everything they wanted, but 
it was making a start. "The measure has its merits. It does 
declare a Government policy. Beyond question it is the will of 
Congress that the Government cease providing opportunities for 
the destructiveness of wage-outting contractors" (28). The 
journal oritioised the laok of a penalty olause for contractors 
who violated the law; and it also was not pleased with the 
thirty-day period between the bill’s passage and when it would 
take effeot. This was "allowing a Roman holiday for oontraot 
letting to wage-outting contractors" (20). The Brioklayers,
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surprising though it may seem, was the only union to make a 
conscientious and concerted effort to see Davis-Bacon pass. The 
editorials closely echoed the opinions labor leaders expressed 
in their testimony at the hearings: The government had a
responsibility to pass Davis-Bacon; it would help the economic 
situation; and it was a practicable bill that had government 
support.
Other labor organizations did take some interest in 
Davis-Bacon. The 1930 proceedings of the 24th Annual Convention 
of the Building Trades Department inoluded a report from 
McDonough on the legislation, and he commented again in 1931 
after the bill’s passage (30). The journal of the Journeymen 
Plumber and Steam Fitters’ Union picked up the news in March 
1931 (31), and in April 1931 noted the bill’s passage (32). The 
Electrical Worker (IBEW) also wrote an editorial in 1931 
supporting Davis-Baoon (33). But as the Bricklayers’ Journal 
pointed out, unions did not rally around the prevailing wage 
issue. The March 1931 issue said, "Of the International Unions 
the only ones to send men into Washington for work in any phase 
of the fight . . . were the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and 
Joiners and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers" 
(34). The American Fedaratlonlat merely noted when the bill 
passed. These other labor journals focused much more frequently 
on unemployment insurance and the anti-injunotion fight. Irving 
Bernstein notes that in this period the "reform issue that 
stirred greatest interest was unemployment insurance" (35). The 
Plumbers, the Carpenters and Ileotrioal workers did offer their
15
support for the measure just before it passed, but they were all 
surprisingly quiet as Congress batted the bill around for four 
years.
What makes the contraction trade unions' indifference to a 
bill that could have helped them immensely surprising is that 
they had a history of being one of the most well-organized 
trades in the country. A number of factors made the contruction 
industry suitable to a strong trade movement. 'The prevalence 
of small contractors, the keen competition in bidding, the local 
character of the industry, the oarly start made in it by 
unionism and the disinclination of building owners to support an 
anti-union fight" (36) contributed to a powerful labor movement 
in the building trades. The local character especially ir *de 
possible a strong local movement, in contrast to a relatively 
weak and decentralized national organization (37). Because the 
industry was structured around a locality— the workers, the 
contractors, and the jobs were all in the same area--it was 
easier foi labor to organize around their common local 
interests.
The hourly wages in the construction industry before the 
depression were higher than those prevailing in most other 
occupations. This was because workers had relatively strong 
organization, and competition was high among contractors who 
needed men for a particular job at a particular time. Also, a 
strong labor movment was able to demand hourly compensation for 
the two to three month period in which workers were unemployed. 
The industry's susceptibility to unemployment was caused by the
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“highly seasonal character of the industry" and "its extreme 
sensitiveness to periods of depression and prosperity" (38). 
These "economic characteristics of the industry" (39) gave 
construction labor an edge in determining their wage rates. They 
were the same characteristics which caused the depression to hit 
labor even harder in bad times.
Union organization could offer no relief for these workers 
in spite of their strong organizational structure. Bernstein 
says, "The depression eroded that vital economic function of 
trade unions-~the maintenance of wage rates in the face of 
falling business activity. Labor organizations fought a 
hopeless rear-guard action; declining rata* in the nonunion 
sector of the economy became irresistible" (40). Labor, 
dependent on the prosperity of its employers, could not su. ive 
the profit crunch. The prosperity of the twenties, although it 
made unions relatively powerful, was not finally transferred to 
the worker. "The gains of advancing technology and rising 
productivity had gone mainly into profits rather than into real 
wages" (41). And once the problems of unemployment grew, union 
membership and dues declined (42). Although the construction 
unions may have been among the strongest in the nation at one 
time, the depression had in effect left them impotent. The 
structure of the industry caused the locality to become a 
breeding ground for competitic ■' between workers rather than 
cooperation. Bernstein's remarks are not specifically directed 
at the building trades, yet they certainly apply to the 
difficulties of all labor, including construction workers.
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There were, then, two aides to the labor situation in 
construction. On one side, the building trades had a long 
history of strong organization, particularly on the local 
level. On the other side, national construction union 
organization in 1931 was especially weak, and economic hardships 
and unemployment had hit the construction trades extremely 
hard. It is not surprising, even in spite of their earlier 
strength, that unions had a hard time rallying around 
Davis-Bacon. Those unions who made themselves heard did indeed 
support the bill. But many unions did not make any cop>vsnt.
This silence can be related to the bill’s limited relevance.
The beneficiaries were centered in large cities, and they were 
workers for only one industry. And unions were preoccupied with 
more universal issues such as unemployment insurance and the 
elimination of yellow-dog contracts. Perhaps the one national 
union that did take the issue to heart, the Bricklayers, was 
particularly prosperous, well-organ!zed locally, or highly in 
tune to the issues that affected its members. The other unions 
might have been too weak, too alienated from their local 
organizations, too preoccupied with other issues, or even 
financially strapped. Whatever the reason, the unions did not 
make Davis-Bacon a law.
If, then, the building trades were relatively quiet about 
Davis-Bacon, others factors must have contributed to its 
passage. Although industry was not usually prone to supporting 
labor issues, leaders of the construction industry did make 
themselves heard at a number of the hearings on Davis-Bacon; and
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they were not in complete opposition. In the March 1930 
hearings, O.W. Rosenthal, president of the Builders Association 
of Chicago lent almost unqualified support to the then Sproul 
bill (43). Another businessman, C.J. Norman, Chairman of the 
Board of Governors of the New York Building Trades Association, 
believed that the constitutionality of the bill was 
questionable, but nevertheless agreed with Rosenthal in a 
carefully qualified statement: MWe believe that there should be
some legislation on the subject*’ (44). These hearings were the 
only ones in which industry leaders testified on the bill. In 
the House debates on the bill in February 1931, Bacon submitted 
three endorsements from contractors (45) but there was no other 
mention of industry attitudes in the official records.
There was an interest among reputable contractors such as 
Rosenthal to promote Davis-Bacon. The industry as a whole 
neither lauded nor condemned the bill, however. A similar gap 
in coverage of Davis-Bacon exists for industrial periodicals as 
it did for labor periodicals. PubilQ Wpgfca, the Contractors end 
Engineers Monthly, and The Constructor add nothing to the 
discussion of Davis-Bacon. Only one magazine, The Engineering 
Hews-Record, took an interest in Davis-Bacon for any extended 
period of time.
This journal gives a good overview of what representatives 
of the construction industry likely thought about Davis-Bacon, 
had they been more inclined to express it in other plaoes. They 
did not like or want contractors to misuse labor: "Exploitation
of labor is always objeotionable, and particularly so in the
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present stress of unemployment" (46). Still, these businessmen
wanted to protect their industry from government interference.
They recognized the problem, but did not believe legislation was
the answer. "It is believed, however, that the contractors can
meet the situation through their own agencies and render
unnecessary further restrictive legislation" (47). They had
specific objections to the regulation by the Secretary of Labor,
"an official whose sympathies are naturally on the side of labor
and who is not accountable for the co3t of the work" (48). Even
with a conservative administration in the White House, they were
not willing to risk a labor secretary's natural bias.
Contractors had different opinions on uhe bill depending on
the size and profit margin of their firms:
Sentiment among contractors is divided as to the 
[Sproul and Bacon] bills. Local firms meeting the 
competition of outside contractors bringing in cheap 
labor to the job generally favor some action along the 
lines suggested. Some large firms doubtless would 
oppose on the reverse grounds (49).
The small firms would have been unable to import labor like the
larger firms. They would have been less able to compete in the
same local markets where big firms could use cheap outside labor
to underbid small firms. By allowing imported labor, the larger
firms had an edge over the small ones.
Construction groups wanted an amendment that would force the
department heads who let contracts to set the wage before they
advertised the bids. This would have allowed the contractors to
budget for a specific wage. The Associated General Contractors
proposed an amendment to do that, but such an amendment was not
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considered, however, because "it was felt that any change in the 
Senate language would endanger the final passage of the measure" 
(50). The industry leaders came up against resistance from the 
administration; the bill would not be changed according to their 
specifications. It would pass without any amendments.
It cannot be supposed from this evidence that the 
construction industry really wanted Davis-Bacon, and some more 
progressive leaders certainly did support the idea. Some 
smallers firms saw an economic advantage. But the industry as a 
unit was lukewarm to negative; and without their amendment, the 
journal commented: "'Prevailing rate of wages’ is, under the
best of conditions, an indefinite and intangible term. Under 
the proposed Davis bill it would be still more indefinite. For 
the good of the publio as well as of an essential industry, the 
bill should be amended or killed" (51). The reports in the 
Engineering News-Record show that most contractors would have 
been perfectly happy without Davis-Bacon.
The labor movement, weak and ineffectual, did not embraoe 
Davis-Bacon as a rallying issue. The oonstruotion industry, 
fairly powerful and influential, although at the beginning of an 
economic slump, did not take an inordinate amount of interest in 
Davis-Bacon either. These two important lobbyists for or 
against labor reform had little to do with the legislation’s 
passage, whioh may show something about the law itself. 
Davis-Bacon is not the best example of an issue of broad impaot 
to either labor or employers generally. It was limited 
oocupationally and geographically. Yet even those speoific
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groups Davis-Bacon affected— the building trade unions and the 
contractors--showed surprising indifference to the it. The 
lukewarm endorsement from a few labor groups and the mixed 
reviews from contractors, when there were any at all, do not at 
all portray interest groups active in seeing a bill pass.
The push for reform from within the administrative structure 
is the only other possible source for Davis-Bacon1s passage.
This in itself seems unlikely because Herbert Hoover is not 
commonly linked with imposing this kind of regulation on an 
industry, nor did Hoover have any ties to labor interests. He 
was an industrial engineer, a businessman, the former Secretary 
of Commerce; but he was not a labor activist. His outlook was 
to see 'such social disturbances as unemployment and labor 
unrest as primarily technical problems1' (52). A 1921 Conference 
on Unemployment concluded that "the proper role of the federal 
government was that of an adviser, coordinator, and supporter, 
not an initiator," all of which were ideas in accordance with 
Hoover's viewpoint. (53). Hoover's administration is more often 
associated with laisses faire policies, especially when it came 
to the regulation of competitive practices within the business 
community. The stipulation that businesses must pay a certain 
rate of wages is certainly an imposed regulation. And as the 
evidence shows, the construction industry, which might have 
influenced the Hoover Administration, did not push the bill at
&L X i ^ s  *
But another surprise of Davis-Baoon is that Hoover oan be 
tied to an ideology that Davis-Baoon represented. He had two
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fundamental programs to regain prosperity; maintaining Mage 
levels and promoting construction. High wages would lead to 
greater consumption and therefore greater prosperity. His labcr 
policy simply "rested on the maintenance of wages and the 
avoidance of strikes" (54). Linked to his idea "that wages 
should be maintained by industry" were the accompanying theories 
"that planned construction should be maintained by industry; and 
government agencies even should increase construction to give as 
much employment as possible" (55). Hoover considered the 
construction industry the most important and influential 
industry in the national economy. Private and public 
construction were needed to stimulate the economy. Construction 
could act as a stimulant for growth during off periods; and 
during inflation, it could be out down. (56).
Hoover even declared a kind of presidential Davis-Bacon 
several months before the bill passed. He announced that the 
Federal Government would insist that contractors of government 
work should pay their communities’ prevailing wages. (57).
Hoover was indeed thinking about the connection between wages 
and the construction industry, and this pre-Davis-Baoon 
declaration shows how important the issue was to Hoover. These 
two philosophies, maintaining wages and promoting construction, 
converged in Davis-Baoon. The prevailing rate of wages bill 
fulfilled Hoover's need to maintain wages. And it protected the 
industry that Hoover believed would remedy the oountry’s 
economic troubles.
Sven though Hoover supported Davis-Baoon, he obviously was
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not responsible for thinking of it or proposing it; nor did he 
actively promote it as it passed through four years of hearings, 
reports, and resolutions. It was a happy break for the measure 
that it fit into Hoover’s mindset. This piece of legislation 
had strong support from Congressmen from the start. Robert 
Bacon began his push with the original 1927 bill, and he did not 
relinquish it in the four years it took to get a bill passed. 
Bacon presented a completely different bill in 1928,
"Preferences of Labor," under the advisement that his original 
bill might have been unconstitutional. "We attempted to attach 
the proposition in a different way in order to aooomplish the 
same general result, namely that the Federal Government should 
not be a party to upsetting labor conditions throughout the 
country when engaged in Federal construction work" (58). Ho 
matter how the issue was presented, Baoon, and most Congressmen, 
were behind it.
Two Congressmen best represented the opinions most of their
colleagues held on the bill. Robert Ramspeok, a Georgian
Democrat, oondemned the praotioe of bootleg labor:
I am in hearty sympathy with the purposes of organised 
labor and have no sympathy with any oontraotor who goes 
into a community and pays anything less than the union 
wage scale of that community, but I do not want the 
reoord to just simply indiot the whole of the Southern 
States, when as far as I know, the fifth district of 
Georgia has no contractors of that sort, and I hope it 
never will (58).
And John MoCoraaok (D-Mass.) said:
The Government should not be a Shylook trying to get 
its pound of flesh. The government should
consider the prevailing wage soale in order to meet the 
desire or oganised labor whioh, as I view it, is not
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selfish but has as its objective, the enactment of 
legislation which would be beneficial to the people 
genorally in this great country of ours (60).
These Congressmen expressed similar ideas as labor did: that
the contractors who exploited labor should be stopped; that the
government should not be an accomplice to this exploitation; and
that this legislation, by stopping these practices, would
alleviate some of the problems of unemployment.
Only one representative came out with any strong opposition
to the bill. Blanton, a Texas Democrat, aocused his fellow
legislators for accepting a labor-dominated bill: "We can not
amend it. You have got to take it Just like organized labor has
written it for you, like a bunch of mocking birds with their
mouths open and their eyes shut" (61). Although some analyses
use Blanton to support the idea that labor pushed this bill, his
accusations are completely unfounded. He must have known, as
did everyone else, that the Hoover administration sat down and
wrote the bill so that it could not be amended.
William Doak, Hoover’s labor secretary, presented the
guidelines the administration established for the bill’s passage
when he testified in the 1931 hearings. He and the government
departments who did the contracting— the departments of the
Treasury, War, Navy, and Labor, and the Veterans’
Bureau— reworked the bill between the .1930 and 1931 sessions.
He made three major points in his testimony. The first was that
they changed the bill so it oould pass. The seoond was that
they had to take into account a manner of different opinions on
how the bill should have been worded. And the last is that they
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would not allow for any changes in the agreed upon text of the 
bill (62).
The main changes in the bill were that the responsibility 
for establishing the wage and dispute settlements fell to the 
Secretary of Labor and that there was no longer any penalty for 
breaking the law. Contractors would merely be in danger of 
forfeiting their status as government bidders. Doak testified, 
"we believed it best to leave out all penalties and to treat 
wage rates in this instance just the same as one would treat 
material or other specifications going into a project" (63). In 
reworking the bill, Doak said they had to listen to a number of 
different opinions on what to do. "He had to give 
considerations to the contentions of the business people and due 
consideration to what the manufacturers had to say in the other 
hearings" (64). Once the administration took the bill, they 
would not allow any changes on it, or they would have withdrawn 
their support. "It is the best they could get out of a 
compromise, and that whenever it is changed, none of us is 
willing to sponsor the bill with that change which would destroy 
the interdepartment understanding we reached" (65). In effect, 
the administration took the bill, eliminated the clauses which 
would have caused the most problems— the penalty— and then gave 
it back to the Congress with the warning that if they amended 
the bill, it would not have gone through.
Three main issues arose from the House debates that
explained why the bill could and should pass at that time, and/
also show why it did indeed pass. First, as Doak’a testimony
ft
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showed, the administration supported the bill. Baoon said, "The 
President, as is well known, is very anxious the wage scale be 
not reduced" (66). William Kopp, a Republican from Iowa, said, 
"At the present time the officials who will let the contracts 
for public building are in entire sympathy with the bill and 
every effort will be made by them to enforce the law" (67).
With the administration and the departments in charge of federal 
contracting behind the bill, there could be no reason for it not 
to be enforced.
Second, the federal construction program, which inoluded not 
only public works but all other government building, was 
becoming a large investment for the government and the country. 
Bacon said, "The Government has embarked on a large construction 
program, perhaps to a total of some five hundred millions of 
dollars" (68). The government had much to gain in "better 
returns for its money in higher efficiency and greater skill" 
(69), according to Texas Demoorat Clay Briggs.
And last, the bill did not try to do anything all that 
radical. David Glover, an Arkansas Democrat, pointed out, "The 
bill does not undertake to fix a wage scale. It simply protects 
labor in the locality or town in which the building la to be 
built for the Government so that imported labor will not be 
brought in and displace local labor" (TO). It Barely 
established a looal prevailing wage that few workers, union or 
non-union, as well a* few oontraotors, could disagree with.
Davis-Bacon had single, goals and simple language. Aeeunedly 
reputable oontraotors had already been paying prevailing wages,
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ao this would not have been a burden. Onions were satistifed 
with a standard previously unheard of. It was not until later 
that non-union and union workers clashed over this issue of the 
prevailing wage.
In its final form, the Davis-Baeon Act caused little 
commotion or controversy. It passed in spite of indifferent 
lobbying from labor and industry. The administration had 
produced a bill that satisfied unions, contractors, and its own 
ideology. It was a small bill that affeoted only one particular 
industry. The government should have felt guilty for allowing
the wage-cutting practices to become so widespread. Congressmen 
such as Sproul, Bacon and Davis promoted the bill, but 
Davis-Bacon would not have passed only with Congressional 
pressure or union support. It passed because it fit into the 
ideologies of the Hoover Administration: it concentrated on two
specific issues--wage maintenance and the stabilization of 
construction— that Hoover and his colleagues felt strongly 
about.
The Davis-Bacon reform had neither strong promoters or 
detractors outside the administrative structure of the 
government. Everything that helped the bill came from within 
the government. It was oonceived by a Congressman and rewritten 
in the administration. It was not by any means a 
labor-sponsored bill, though labor leaders endorsed it.
Industry oould not stop it beoauce the bill did not truly 
attempt anything extraordinary. The Davis-Bacon Act was a 
painless reform for Hoover's administration that not only their
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ideology, but it was progressive and forward-looking in its own 
small way.
CHAPTER 2 
THE WAGNER ACT
The National Labor Relations Act, or Wagner Act, provides a much 
grander stage on which to view legislative labor reform than the 
Davis-Bacon Act. It was both a crowning achievement for the New 
Dealers, and one of its most despised laws among New Deal 
opponents. The Wagner Act gave workers the right to organize 
themselves into unions of their own choice. It protected their 
right to bargain collectively and to choose their own 
representatives by a majority vote. Employers who interfered with 
these rights oould be accused of unfair labor practices; and the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was established to enforoe the 
provisions of the law. The Wagner Act opened the door for 
full-scale union representation.
Considering the climate of the 1930s it is somewhat astonishing 
that this bill became a law. Business and government interests had 
teamed up to administer the codes and practices provided for by the
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). Because the bill promoted
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employees' rights over employers’ interests, business hardly 
supported this new legislation. They had opposed earlier labor 
reform in the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA); the NIRA 
olause which promoted similar principles of oolleotive bargaining 
rights met with little compliance from industry. Unlike the 
Davis-Bacon Aot, and the later ELSA whioh both reoeived 
administrative approval, the President treated the Wagner Aot with a 
hands-off approaoh. Roosevelt himself had little desire to promote, 
labor organisation in the faoe of business opposition. And when
compared to the labor clause In the NIRA, the Wagner Act called 
for even strioter standards. The New Republic called the bill, 
"as deeply controversial a measure as has been in Congress for 
years" (1). The dilemma, then, is how did the Wagner Act pass? 
There must be an explanation for the passage of a bill that the 
most powerful and influential segments of the country opposed.
The questions that arise are: what was business doing while
this bill was in process; how did labor use its muscle; and 
where does the government fit into the picture?
The questions that surround the Wagner Act are more 
troubling and thought-provoking than the problems of 
Davis-Bacon, simply because the impact and the extent of a 
government-protected collected bargaining policy was much 
greater than the prevailing wage issue of the earlier law. The 
Wagner Act not only provoked enormous controversy when it was 
first introduced, but historians still pussle over the question 
of why the act passed. There has not been, however, any sense 
of a historical consensus about the Wagner Act. The historical 
theories whioh attempt to explain why the Wagner Act passed fall 
into three broad categories: business control of the prooess,
government control of the process, and labor control of the 
prooess.
David Montgomery expands on the first theory in his book 
Worker*a Control in Aeorloa in whioh he says that government 
intervention inhibited the freedom of unions (2). Business 
advisors urged that sinoe unionisation was unavoidable, 
management should "encourage the development of suoh union
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structures and policies as would be least inhibiting to 
management's aims" (3). According to Montgomery, the alliance 
between business and government carried over into the passage of 
the Wagner Act at the expense of the rank-and-file worker.
Montgomery implies that the result--that "the rank and file 
could in time be tamed and the newly powerful unions be 
subjected to tight legal and political control" (4)--was 
causally linked to an alliance between management and 
government.
The second interpretatation relates to Montgomery’s theory, 
but it places its emphasis on the government to explain why the 
Wagner Act passed. The government used its own administrative 
power to oontrol labor even without business instigation. 
Christopher Tomlins says that "order and stability, no less than 
demooraoy, were the goals of labor relations policy" (5). Labor 
no longer could determine how their institutions should be run; 
the government determined what was best for the public interest, 
and labor unions lost their independence along with their 
self-determination of collective bargaining rights (6). Howell 
Harris says that the Wagner Act, by giving the NLBB exclusive 
power over collective bargaining, denied unions their autonomy 
and ignored unions’ definition of their own Jurisdiction (7). 
Harris asserts that although "organised labor supported its 
bureauoratio and congressional friends' legislative proposals," 
they "played little part in determining whet they were and 
scarcely understood their detailed implications" (8).
The foous of these historians’ interpretations of the Wagner
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Act is that the government gained too much power over a labor 
movement unaware of the consequences of such regulation. Labor 
no longer could determine its own goals because the government, 
in establishing the power of the NLRB, had bestowed legitimacy 
on unions rather than supporting the unions’ legitimacy in 
itself. The first NLRB emphasized "professionalism, legal 
process, and centralized review." This focus on efficiency (9) 
continued in the Wagner Act, sidestepping the AFL proposal to 
protect "the freedom of the established national unions to 
formulate their own organizing strategy" and to "ensure 
recognition as autonomous institutions with established rights." 
their freedom to determine their own strategy and to maintain 
autonomy from outside government control (10).
The last theory is that labor gave the strongest support to 
passage of the Wagner Aot. Labor asserted its considerable 
power in the oountry to force the bill through Congress. Irving 
Bernstein suggests that the unsuccessful campaign of the 
National Association of Manufacturers to kill the Wagner bill 
was in part due to labor’s power. Labor interests "lobbied 
rigourously" in the spring of 1935 to "press the Administration 
and Congress for the AFL legislative program, in which the labor 
relations bill was oruoial" (11). Bernstein also notes that 
labor was highly influential, and few senators were willing to 
"faoe the AFL at the polls with a negative vote on their
records” (12). J. Joseph Huthmaoher, in his biography of
/
Senator Wegner, giveb oredit to labor and liberal support in 
Congress; but he particularly reoognises Wagner’s part in the
process: “He was its legislative instigator and tactician, and
before Congress, the President, and the public he was its most 
ardent champion'1 (13), According to tlnse interpretations, 
then, labor and its liberal allies within Congress and the 
Roosevelt administration contributed the most to the act’s 
passage.
As one sided arguments are liable to do, these 
interpretations have some shortcomings. Montgomery’s analysis 
in effect Ignores what businessmen were saying at that time. 
Testimony in the Congressional Hearings on the bill shows that 
businessmen were, with few exceptions, opposed to the bill.
Such business luminaries as James Emery, General Counsel of the 
National Association of Manufacturers; Walter Merrit, 
representing the League for Industrial Rights; and Henry I. 
Harriman, president of the Chamber of Commei of the United 
States; as well as thirty-six other businessmen, spoke out 
against the bill at the Hearings. This does not even include 
the numerous telegrams and briefs businessmen sent to the 
committee in opposition, nor does it include the many 
representatives of company unions who were paid by their 
employers to testify against the bill. Only three businessmen, 
representing two minor tobacco manufacturers, were in favor of 
the bill. Those against the Wagner bill represented almost 
every industry: publishing, mining, testlles, oil, steel,
automobile, furniture, rubber, and on* from this evidence, it 
makes sense to conclude that United States manufacturers were 
nearly unanimous in their opposition to the Wagner bill; it was
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"anathema to the industrial employer" (14).
Businesses stances had two main themes: they objected to a
government extension of power into the sacred sphere of 
employer/employee relationships: and they feared that labor
would be given an inordinate and dangerous amount of power. In 
relationship to the first objection, Harriman said, 
"substantially every record of every employer in the United 
States could be open to the whims of roving investigators. This 
would be an invasion of personal eights, for which I think there 
is no constitutional warrant" (15). James L. Donnelly of the 
Illinois Manufacturers1 Association said, "this bill wouid 
prevent practically any effort on the pari, o# the employer to 
advise and counsel his workers regarding the condition of their 
employment, whereas it would permit and legalize almost 
unlimited coercion and force on the part of labor agents who may 
allege to be representatives of the workmen" (16). And Business 
Week astutely noted that the Wagner bill would give "government 
approval for practical outlawry of company unions, the 
requirement that representatives of a majority shall overrule 
minorities, . . . and the imposition of restrictions upon 
employers without provision for preventing union coercion of 
employees" (17). If businesmen intended to use this bill to 
undermine labor as Montgomery proposes, they must have kept 
these intentions secret,
One of the results of the administration of the Wagner Act 
was that labor, particularly the AFl*, resented the interference 
from the government and felt that labor interests had been
placed second to government Interests. This outcome colors the 
interpretations of these historians. “It is one thing to 
acknowledge this result [an institutionalization of unions] and 
quite another to conclude that Senator Wagner’s remarkable
legislative achievement in 1935 must therefore have come about 
. , at the hands of a few unusually broad-minded industrial
and corporate leaders with the capacity to shape political 
events miraculously to their liking" (18). There is little 
evidence to support business’ role in an inaiduous conspiracy 
with the government, and to assert such a theory imposes a 
structure on their intentions whi* h ignores their expressed 
positions.
Tomlins’ «md Harris’ theory * that liberal government 
administrators were trying to control labor against its 
will-~works until labor’s role is eiiamined more closely.
Although labor leaders had some disagreements about the hill's 
proposed administration and scope, they were with few exceptions 
willing to be subject to government regulation. This 
willingness does not then imply that the government controlled 
labor. It is just as possible that labor used the government to 
its own ends. William Green’s editorial in the American 
fadarationlat of April 1935 said, “The question of whether labor 
shall have the right to organise and to bargain collectively is 
now squarely before Congress and Congress cannot avoid 
decision. Passage of the Wagner Bill will give reality to this 
right” (19). Green recognized explicitly labors need for 
Congressional support and legislation to achieve its goals.
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Charlton Ogburn, general counsel for the AFL, did offer 
several amendments, bv they were designed to strengthen and 
expand on the law, rather than to weaken it. Contrary to 
Harris* views, the AJL did not show any misunderstanding or 
naivete about the purpose of the bill or its implications.
Ogburn first suggested changing the definition of labor 
organizations to exclude "any agency or employee representation 
committee or plan"--the company unions--and to make organizing 
such groups unlawful. He wanted labor to have a representative 
voice in the now Labor Board; and he wanted to give the NLRB 
jurisdiction in the automobile industry (20). None of these 
amendments, however, interfered with Ogburn*& enthusiasm ior the 
bill itself: "We think the bill will go very far toward
establishing the principle of collective bargaining, in that it 
will prohibit employers from interfering with the organization 
of their employees. We feel if that prohibition is enforced, 
employees will organize voluntarily" (21),
The views of Bernstein and Huthmaoher— that labor along with 
its allies in the government were the key instigators of the 
act--is merely too limited. It places too much emphasis on the 
effect labor had to instigate passage of the Wagner bill. 
Although labor had gained some power from the NIRA’s oolleotive 
bargaining clause, its lobbying power within the government had 
not been firmly established. The national unions did give the 
bill their full support, yet still did not shape the Wagner Act 
in any substantial way. Their support is tied into other 
faotors that led to the bill9a passage, and It does not stand
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alon^.
The deficiencies of these interpretations show that these 
historians have not adequately explained why the bill passed. 
They do not account for the bill's sidestep around business 
power, and they do not wholly account for the developing 
alliance of labor and government that was previously absent in 
the NIRA. These authors do include some points that suggest 
that labor reform came from a variety of sources. Huthmacher, 
as well as Harris, note Wagner's importance in the bill's 
passage; and there is no doubt that Wagner's influence and 
determination had an impact on public recognition of the bill. 
Wagner's name was attached to the bill; and he was the bill's 
sponsor in front of the nation, on the radio, and in the papers 
(22). Harris certainly gives credit to the drafters of the bill 
who could write an act removed from “judicial meddling and 
attack," and to Wagner's power to force the bill to a vote with 
or without FDR. Harris also says that the content of the bill 
had the benefit of two years of experience of employer 
opposition to unionism (23). Harris and Huthmacher both mention 
that the Wagner Act filled a vacuum left after the Supreme Court 
killed the NRA (24). Huthmacher and Bernstein note that not 
only did businessmen like Harriman question the bill's 
constitutionality, but the senators themselves believed they 
could pass the bill and wait for the Court to void it later 
(25). Their valid conclusions all involve the machinery of the 
government: labor's impact on the government prooess; Wagner's
importance; the role of the Supreme Court; and the
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administrative preparedness that came from two years of business 
opposition. But these fragmented ideas work much better within 
a more complex framework that can account for changes in the 
power structure.
Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold suggest in their essay, 
"State, Party, and Industry: From Business Recovery to the
Wagner Act," that to find out why the bill passed with such 
opposition from business, it is necessary to look to 
"intragovernmenta1 developments that came together in 1935 to 
allow advocates of strong legal support for unionisation" to 
enter the legislative arena (26). Skocpol believes that 
industry could not stop the Wagner bill because the NRA oou'i 
not establish concrete business cooperation that would promote 
recovery. The oollapse of the NRA showed that the private 
capitalists * answers to what was good for the economy were not 
necessarily the right answers, When business lost control over 
the definition of a recovery program, that in turn created a new 
balance of political forces (27). Skocpol attributes the bill’s 
passage to the inability of industry to work within the 
government which caused both the failure of the NRA to promote 
recovery, "as well as the changing party system of the 1930s" 
(26).
Industry, although opposed to the bill, simply did not have 
the ability to stop it. This stemmed from the collapse of 
businass and govarnaant oooparation on tha NRA. The Illinois 
Manufaotars' Association suggested ending tha NRA in Maroh 1936 
baoausa tha rise in prioas hurt consumer demand; produotion and
volume increases were slowing down; employer/employee 
relationships were strained; and it intruded into private 
affairs (29). Two months later during the furor over the 
possible extension of the NRA, industry was divided over what to 
do about NRA. "1500 businessmen . . . praised the codes of fair 
competition, saying that their effect had been to minimise 
destructive competition, help turn losses into profits, and 
improve the conditions of labor." But large industrial groups 
did not want an extension, nor did retailers and other 
businesses which opposed price fixing (30). It was exactly 
these conflicts which caused the NRA to fall apart.
Those in oharge of formulating the oodes, the deputy oode 
administrators, "had been drawn from the ranks of business"
(31) , and that in itself created problems. They "brought 
conflicts within and between industries into a political arena"
(32) . The NRA lacked either "trained government officials 
experienced in regulation or planning for industry with 'the 
public interest’ and some conception of the whole economy in 
mind” (33). An incompetent and uncooperative administrative 
staff was "permeated by conflicting business interests" (34) and 
oould not sustain itself.
Promoting business activity could no longer be the only
solution for eoonomio recovery. Labor had something
constructive to say about the problems of the NRA:
considering the faot that the law itself had to be 
interpreted through administration, that the 
administrative staff . . . was groping for the meaning 
of the law, and that industry itself had to break from 
its old moorings and praotioes and develop the
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procedure of balanced economy--that all this has been
imperfectly accomplished should occasion little wonder
(35).
Qranted that labor took some glee in the demise of business and 
the NRA codes; but the point is that industry could no longer 
cooperate with the government. The law went against the grain 
of industrial competition. Business did not support the NRA any 
longer because it did not further their own ends. Not only did 
industry fail to make the NRA work, but the law itself had too 
many inherent weaknesses to succeed. The government did not 
have the Administrative machinery to regulate the economy 
through business. "The NRA was unprepared either to classify 
industries uniformly prior to the negotiation of labor and trade 
provisions or to provide for subsequent dministration of the 
codes. The result was chaos" (36). The National Recovery Act 
gave the government few means to actually enforce its codes and 
provisions.
Without enforcement, the NRA administration relied on each 
industry to regulate itself. And without strong supervision 
from the code agencies, mostly run by businessmen, business did 
not fall into line with the provisions and codes of the NRA. 
"Serious administrative dissension" in the NRA and the New Deal 
led to the breakdown of compliance with codes (37). The 
partnership betweer government and industry was the key to the 
suooess of NRA’s programs; and when this partnership broke down, 
other interests, labor especially, were able to gain more 
prominenoe and power. Government no longer relied on industry 
to solve the eoonomlo problems of the oountry, as industry oould
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not rely on the government to solve their problems. Once the 
Supreme Court declared the NRA unconstitutional, all t*es were 
broken. The absence of regulating legislation and the broken 
bond between government and industry contributed to a 
legislative environment In which labor reform could pass. Their 
complete failure, however, would prepare the way for more 
careful government planning (38) especially in the Wagner Act 
and FLSA.
Government intervention in the field of labor reform did not 
originate with the New Deal. As Davis-Bacon showed, depression 
conditions prompted government aation to prevent falling wages 
two years before Roosevelt’s New Deal. And even before the 
1930s, government had been regulating labor conditions. A short 
legislative history of labor reform will show that although the 
idea of a law to establish collective bargaining rights may have 
been radical, government intervention in labor relations issues 
had not been at all unusual (39). In 1908 the Supreme Court 
interpreted the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 to issue 
injunctions against labor strikes and boycotts. The Clayton Act 
of 1014 was meano to amend this interpretation of the Sherman 
Act. Although the Clayton Act was designed to uphold labor’s 
position, the court determined that labor still was accountable 
for its ooeroive actions. The Court also allowed private 
parties to obtain injunctions whioh were far more harmful to 
labor than government injunction had been. Presidential 
interventions were also oommon in labor relations with 
government. Presidents Cleveland, McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt,
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Wilson, Harding and Coolidge all intervened in labor disputes to 
arrange settlements or to send federal troops.
Closer to the time period, the Norris-LaQuardia Act of 1932 
outlawed the labor injunction and the yellow dog contract which 
required workers to pledge not to unionise as a condition of 
employment. The Railway Labor Act, as amended in 1934, set a 
precedent for labor policy that the Wagner Act would follow 
(40). The one-sided character of the Wagner Act was really not 
unusual when held up against other one-sided legislation in 
favor of industry, such as tariff.), subsidies, tax concessions, 
or free municipal bonds to industries (41). Where labor was 
concerned, the government historically had taken an active role 
in its regulation.
The relationship between government and labor continued into 
the New Deal. Section 7a of the NIRA encouraged union 
membership as wel.1 as union agitation. The New York Times 
reported that AFL membership rose by 1.3 million people since 
the NRA had begun four months before, to bring the total AFL 
membership up to four million (42). This encouragement also led 
to unrest and strikes as the NRA recognized workers’ rights to 
join unions. 1934 was a banner year for strikes and violence, 
which had both economic and political concerns. The economio 
issues involved wages und hours, such as the NRA codes attempted 
to regulate. The more important political issues oentered 
around collective bargaining, and the NRA's labor clause 
contributed to a rise in labor aoncern over their rights to 
organise (43).
43
Roosevelt established the National Labor Board to oversee 
the problems Section 7a brought to the government.
Unfortunately for labor, the NLB did not have any power to 
enforce its pronouncements. "The NLRB’s initial achievements 
assured very few substantive long term gains for organised 
labor. Industry too often refused to comply with the board’s 
ruling and both the president and much of the NRA bureaucracy 
took an ambivalent position on the question of union power, 
frequently accepting the direct oontradition of NLB policy"
(44). In 1934, Wagner proposed a bill that would give the NLB 
the power to enforce its policies. As it went through the 
Senate, the committee and past Roosevelt, the bill became 
modified and watered-down until it barely resembled its original 
form. Wagner dropped the bill; and Roosevelt established a 
National Labor Relations Board with Public Resolution Number 44 
which was supposed to take the place of the ineffective NLB.
This resolution did not invest a labor board with any more power 
than bills had previously (45).
The American Federationiat in June 1935 pointed out the 
specific problems of the NRA and P.R. 44 labor boards: their
provisions were ambiguous, which left room for 
misinterpretation; they were excessively generalised in regard 
to the principle of oolleotive bargaining; they diffused 
administrative responsibility rather than assigning speoific 
Jobs; they gave no powei to the NLRB; and any elections for 
union representation oould be contested in the courts and tied 
up for months (46). In the hearings, Franois Biddle, then
Chairman of the NLRB, testified that the Board could not 
subpoena witnesses, nor did it have the "power to enforce its 
own decisions." The Board also faced tremendous delays in the 
machinery of the NLRB whi"h hurt the labor grievants much more 
than it did the defendants (47). Even though the NLB and later 
the NLRB were designed to give labor rights, the law supporting 
them was sufficiently vague and unenforcable that their 
effectiveness was severely limited.
In spite of the shaky foundations that labor and government 
cooperation rested on, labor had its advocates within the 
government. The New Deal Democratic power was becoming 
increasingly urban and ethnic— the mainstay of union 
membership. The 1934 elections gave Democrats overwhelming 
majorities in both the House and the Senate. Time reported that 
the November 1934 election was the "nearest thing possible to a 
national referendum of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal." The 
Democrats gained thirteen seats in the House and nine seats in 
the Senate (48), an extraordinary achievement for an off-year 
election. Congress had a liberal bent with sympathies that 
leaned toward labor interests. The heavy strike action in 1934 
brought labor reform to the forefront of legislative 
consciousness. The Times said in Hay 1934 that, "There is every 
indication that the nation will witness a Summer of strikes in 
many widely scattered industries, and the tally of the year is 
likely to break records" (49). There was a recognition before 
and after the elections that something needed to be done about 
labor unrest. With their connections to strong pro-labor
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constituencies, legislators were ready to seriously consider new 
legislation that would alleviate the tensions of 1934. The 
post-NRA decline in successful alignments between industry and 
government also contributed to a government which turned to 
labor legislation.
As important as the partisan make-up of the government was 
the ability of the administrators to write a bill that could be 
passed. Peter Irons’ book The Mew Deal Lawyers shows tho 
contributions that men of experience and ability made to the 
Wagner’s bill passage. The bill's draftsmen were all skilled 
lawyers. They knew how the legal process worked and how to 
frame a viable bill. Their experience was in stark contrast to 
the drafters of previous New Deal legislation. The authors of 
the earlier legislation had been primarily politicians, 
bureaucrats and lobbyists, and each group had its own political 
agenda to pursue (50). The NBA did not last because its 
administration was unorganised and weak. It was not laid out in 
any coherent, effective manner. Its goals were so broad and 
diffuse so that ultimately nothing would ever be accomplished.
But the Wagner bill had one specific goal: to stop employer
violation of collective bargaining agreements. With that one 
goal oame the advantage of hindsight: neither the NLB nor P.R. 
44’s NLRB oould process the oomplaints of employer violation of 
Section 7a (51). The NLB’s and the NLRB's lack of success made 
the framers recogniii the need for specifioity and clarity to 
survive oourt interpretation (52). William Qreen wrote in the 
April 1935 Federatlonlst. "this bill was drafted on a basis of
experience for the purpose of removing those conditions which 
make ineffective the right of wage-earners to organize" (53). 
Green knew that the previous problems creating a viable 
collective bargaining policy would contribute to writing a 
stronger bill more able to withstand the court.
The problems of constitutionality which dogged other New 
Heal legislation made these lawyers aware of the pitfalls of 
unspecific goals. They based the Wagner Act’s constitutionality 
on the commerce clause and the due process clause of the 
Constitution. Strikes and labor unrest adversely affect the 
channels of commerce; and the inequality of bargaining power 
deprived workers of actual liberty of contract" which 
"substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce" (54). 
Government had a history of intervention in labor disputes with 
injunctions and presidential orders. In response to the 
constitutionality questions, Wagner said in May 1935 that the 
proposed bill delegated no legislative authority so it could not 
be accused of usurping Congress’s jurisdiction, and that labor 
regulation directly related to the regulation of interstate 
commerce (55). Since the NRA was declared unconstitutional, 
support and opposition alike knew that the bill would eventually 
be tested in the court. However, the demise of the NRA even 
worked in favor of the Wagner bill. There was a distinct 
absence of recovery programs after the NRA fell. The labor bill 
could fill this legislative hole as well as give senators labor 
support. And a number of senators did believe that vhe bill 
would eventually be declared unconstitutional, so they could
vote for it without truly endorsing ivs philosophy (56).
The Wagner Act was written with little input from the 
presidency. Roosevelt "never was greatly interested in the 
subject [of the Wagner Act' and gave the proposal his support 
only at the last minute and then under considerable political 
pressure" (57). But Roosevelt's reluctance to support the bill 
was not decisive because Wagner could work through a Congress 
receptive to his initiatives on behalf of t,*e industrial working 
class. Urban liberals dominated Congress, and they were willing 
to support pro-labor legislation. The presidential indifference 
meant little to a well-organized and highly motivated grou*. of 
powerful Congressmen.
The Wagner Act had powerful allies and powerful adversaries 
outside the government. Saying that this law was unusual 
because it passed over businessmen's heads means not that 
industry secretly wanted the bill passed; but that because of 
the circumstances of the recovery, business could not mobilize 
its usually extensive resources within the government. That 
labor worked within the scope of government control should not 
imply that the government somehow manipulated labor's true 
intentions; instead it shows that labor recognized that their 
only reoourse was the government, and that they could not 
reasonably hope to gain anything working outside these 
established routes.
Rather than working around established centers of power, 
organised labor worked within them. Labor had little need to 
work outside or around the government. The AFL leaders used
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their power to oall for legislation, not upheaval. A March 1935 
Federationlst editorial urged, "It is upon organized labor that 
the adoption of the Wagner Bill will depend. This means every 
union man and woman, every union official, must use to the full 
his influence in having this bill enacted into law." (58) 
William Oreen said in his testimony at the hearings: "We cannot
and will not continue to urge workers to have patience, unless 
the Wagner bill is made law, and unless it is enforced, once it 
becomes law" (59). Labor used its power within the confines of 
the government. They could urge union members to press their 
Congressmen to decision; they could threaten strikes if their 
plans were not carried out. Labor had its legislative agenda, 
and the go ernment was able to respond to it.
The key to the puzzle of the Wagner Act is how the 
government worked. Only the state had the ability to change 
labor’s status in the workplace. Which group prevailed, 
business or labor, depended on a complex set of relationships 
between the government and the concerned parties. As the 
balance of power in the government shifted from industry to 
labor in 1934 and 1935, labor gained some important allies among 
the framers of government polioy, an advantage only allowed 
businessmen earlier in the New Deal. But without a receptive 
and able group of administrators, the bill would have been 
doomed to the fate of the NBA. Labor reform benefited from a 
long history of labor legislation, a determined sponsor, and 
framers who set out to write a bill that would pass, rather than 
to promote particular agendas. The Wagner Aot paired beoause
the government had the machinery to respond to the call for 
labor reform. Although there may have been a large support base 
for reform, the initiative for the Wagner Act came from sources 
already politically entrenched.
Even though the Wagner Aot showed a shift in government 
sensibilities, it did not show an entirely open arena for labor 
reform. The writers of the Wagner Act used their own 
considerable knowledge and experience and did not really solicit 
labor’s approval. Certainly the bill coincided with organised 
labor goals, but the workings of a less open government has led 
many to an interpretation that the government ignored labor 
interests. It did not, but in the case of the Wagner Aat, the 
process came to fruition fully within the government. The Fair 
Labor Standards Aot offers a completely different method of 
successful federal labor legislation.
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CHAPTER 3
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
The prooess in which national labor standards came to the 
legislative and political arena was Tar more complex than either 
Davis-Bacon or the Wagner Act. From its inception, the Fair 
Labor Standards (FLS) bill was different from the others. The 
eoonomic implioations--and interpretations'— of the bill created 
regional and philosophical divisions between pre iy cohesive
lobbies from business or labor, and even previously united 
political ooalitions within the government. Labor unions were 
deeply divided on the viability of labor standards, which 
reflected the growing tt lit between industrial and craft 
unions. Industrial leaders predominately opposed standards, yet 
some who served to benefit from minimum wages and maximum hours 
gave it a measure of support. The lower prevailing wages and 
longer work weeks in the South made the oost of labor muoh lower 
there, and southern industry fought to proteot these standards. 
They opposed any attempt to restructure their prevailing wages 
and hours because it undermined the basis of their economy.
Unlike the other two oases, the original impetus for labor 
standards was within an administration, not from a concerned 
Congressman. This shows that by the time this legislation came 
around, labor reform had become more part of the 
administration's mainstream program. In spite of an 
enthusiastic administration, the Democrats were not unified 
behind Roosevelt, and the Mew Deal M e n t i o n  in Congress that
had auooeeded so well with the Wagner Aot was rapidly
» ■ • "
deteriorating. Congressmen lined up with their regional and 
geographic interosts, or with powerful industrial or labor 
groups, rather than in line with their parties. The law had the 
most arduous path to final passage of any of the oases. A 
Business Week artiole said in 1936, "Something is bound to be 
sorewy about any analysis of the prospeots for wage-hour 
legislation. . . . Nobody can reconcile all the oontrary faotors 
that will determine its fate" (1).
The legislative history of the Fair Labor Standards Act is 
oomplex and detailed (2). My purpose, rather than to retell an 
already told history, is to show, as I have in the other oases, 
the overlapping and contradictory initiatives that contributed 
to a Congressional labor reform. The complexity of this 
particular labor reform requires a different kind of telling 
than the other two oases. The reform went through so many 
ohanges; and the parties involved, both inside and outside 
government, so often rearranged their positions and realigned, 
that to arbitrarily deolare that business, labor or government 
had the upper hand is presumptuous in suoh a multi-layered 
prooess. My argument will instead follow three stages of the 
bill and show which groups had the most influence during these 
stages. Unlike the oases of Davis-Baoon and the Wagner Act, no 
one group can be dismissed offhand as uninflueatial or 
unimportant beoause of their political powerlessuess. The power 
bases changed constantly during the year FLfiA went through the
emsmwtemu^ sa as
whan the bill was introduced to when it passed. The first 
established the support for and opposition to the bill. The 
orifinal bill was introduced in the first session of the 75th 
Congress, and four variations of the bill followed until the end 
of the session in August (3). The second stage oovers the 
dealings in Congress and especially in the House CosHnittee on 
Labor during the special session of November and December 1937. 
It was in this second round that the opposition dealt a blow to 
the administration by holding up this key pieoe of legislation. 
The last round inoludes Roosevelt's push for passage beginning 
in early 1938, through to the bill’s final restructuring in 
June. This stage shows Roosevelt and his administration most 
willing to compromise to assure a viotory for their labor 
standards plan.
Once again a brief legislative history of applicable labor 
legislation is neoessary to understand the impact of federal 
legislation. The origins of TLSA oan be traoed to a number of 
sources. States had labor standards legislation on their books 
going back to the 1910s and 1920s. The oonoept of labor 
standards was not new, although the constitutionality of this 
type of legislation was not particularly seoure (4). Xn 
national legislation, three laws foreshadowed the philosophy of 
the V IA  bill: Davis-Baeon, the MIRA and the Walsh-Healey Act.
Of these, only Davis-Bacon and Nalsh-Bealey were still valid in 
1937. Davia-Beooa established the pre/ailing wage standard for 
the federal oemstruetien industry. In 1383 it was jpindsi to 
ineteds a lg>altg~olawe for miscreant; ooatraotees, erne of the
provisions which labor and soma members of Congress had wanted 
in 1931. The Walsh-Healey Act, passed in 1935, set up minimum 
standards for the production of goods sold to the government. 
Frances Perkins, Roonevelt’s secretary of labor, considered 
Walsh-Healey a forerunner to the FLSA because it oovered 
industry broadly to establish flexible minimum wages, a 
forty-hour week, and a ban on child labor (5). Walsh-Healey 
expanded the oonoept of the government as model employee first 
promoted in Davis-Baoon, but Walsh-Healey took Davis-Bacon one 
step further to inolude all industry that did business with the 
government.
The NIRA and the board whioh created and oversaw its 
wage-hour standards, the NRA, had the olosest relationship to 
the FLS bill (6). The NRA established codes for nearly every 
industry in an effort to prevent more deoline in the country’s 
productivity. The maximum wag* and minimum hour oriteria ware 
part of an effort to stabilise falling prioas. The oodas also 
attacked ohild labor as a practioe not conducive to business 
praotioes (7). The NRA was least suooassful in establishing a 
uniform minimum wage. The oomplex wage structure of the country 
overpowered any regulation the NRA oould enforoe. As far as 
hours, the NRA "pushed standards in the direction of more 
national [eheok quote] norms," but "these were emerging rather 
than olearly established norms." The ISA was meat suooassful in 
eradicating ohild labor abuses (•). Nhea the Supreme Court 
iaivalldmted the NIRA, the ieame of labor ttamderds had already 
:)MMS eitMMOdi ami it fit not lihaly to be dropped (•). The
NIRA had introduced another government polioy on labor, 
collective bargaining, whioh was reformed into the Wagner Act. 
The Wagner Act in itself did not address labor standards, but 
its presenoe lent credibility to the drive for other labor 
reforms. The Supreme Court’s 1937 ruling in favor of the Wagner 
Aot’s constitutionality extended Congress’ power to regulate 
under the commerce olause, and paved the way for more 
legislation (10).
Round One: Roosevelt's Adminstrative Initiative 
Roosevelt and Perkins were sitting on a labor standards bill 
that had been drafted a year before and held until a more 
opportune time, and the opening of the 75th Congress seemed to 
be perfeot. Although Roosevelt shied away from promoting a new 
NIRA in his 1936 campaign and arousing resentment (11), the time 
following the 1936 eleotion created a "politioal setting [which] 
seemed ideal for quick action by President and Congress" for 
labor standards legislation. Both parties bad proclaimed the 
need for improved standards. Roosevelt in a 1936 campaign 
speech said he "had only just begun to fight" for better 
conditions. He pledged "to oontinue to seek to improve working 
conditions for the workers of America— to reduoe hours that are 
overlong;, to inorease wages that spell starvation, to end the 
labor of children mad to wipe out sweatshops" (12) Roosevelt 
carried forty-six states in a landslide eleotion. The Democrats 
dominated Congress, and there were only two Republicans on the 
tfrjrtosm-rergta Bamatt Oowmittee on Iduoatlon amd Labor 
CwiMttas <*»). Roosevelt used his tr— sadoss regularity to
•place new legislation which would combat depression conditions 
at the top of his list of priorities for Congress, and FL8 was 
one of those bills.
Roosevelt and his administration, with support from New 
Dealers in Congress, took the initiative for labor standards 
legislation. The bill was a combination of ideas from the Labor 
Department; Roosevelt aides Benjamin Cohen and Thomas Corooran; 
Hugo Black, then the ohairman of the Senate Committee on 
Education and Labor; and assorted labor leaders (14).
.Roosevelt's assistants took the Department of Labor bill, 
redrafted it, and gave it to Blaok to introduce in the Senate 
(15). Roosevelt shrewdly had Blaok front the bill to make 
"possible the pretense that the bill [was] entirely the work of 
Congress," which of course it was not (16). Roosevelt had 
delayed the introduction of the bill from the opening of the 
session to later in May, thinking that it would unite the 
Demoorats after the furious battle over his court reform bill. 
Politically, he thought the bill oould be "the perfect 
band-wagon on which to ride into the elections of 1936” (17).
He miscalculated the opposition that would come from regional 
and labor-aligned foroes, however (18). From its inoeption, the 
FL8 bill generated a formidable opposition ooalition of business 
organisations, the powerful old-guard oraft unionism of the AFL 
and a bipartisan group of Congressional conservatives. Beoause 
the bill threatened these groups economically and/or 
polltioaily, they banned together to confront the administrative 
iiitJgAlee.V
The framers of the bill had made every effort to avoid 
arousing exactly that kind of opposition coalition. Their 
objectives certainly were worthy: to establish a minimum hourly
wage and maximum weekly hours, and to eliminate child labor.
The minimum wage would prevent wages from dropping below what 
was determined as a minimum standard "so that the marginal 
worker cannot be made the football of competition" (19). The 
ceiling on hours would allow for fuller employment because more 
workers could be hired for fewer hours per week. The 
elimination of child labor would eradicate an exploitative labor 
practice. The bill’s supporters argued that FLS would raise 
purchasing power by raising wages; combat unemployment by 
spreading out hours; and clean-up sweatshop'' and factories by 
eliminating child labor (20).
Although the bill owed a lot to the NIRA, the framers tried 
to avoid some of the problems that oaused that law to 
self-destruct, just as the framers of the Wagner Act had 
attempted to avoid the similar ambiguities and misunderstandings 
of the NIRA’s National Labor Board. The framers particularly 
wanted to avoid the problems that had arisen between the oode 
administrators and the enforcement of the codes. These 
conflicts had been primarily the result of businessmen’s 
administrative responsibility to promote protective codes on 
industry and their own profit motives (21). To avoid these 
problems, the first FLS draft laid down definite standards to a 
board, rather than allowing government agencies to decide 
somewhat arbitrarily what standards should be, "perhaps the
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chief ground on which the NRA had been invalidated" (22).
Neither did the bill attempt to regulate buoineas practices or 
prices, but fooused only on wages, hours and child labor, and 
thus eliminated a major source of administrative hold-up in the 
NRA (23). It did not allow for an "internal oonilict of 
objectives to cause administrative indigestion," as did the NRA 
with businessmen defining their own industrial codes (24).
The framers also had the confidence to ground the bill’s 
constitutionality in the commerce olause, as the Wagner Act’s 
had been. They used this reasoning to assert that the 
government would have regulatory power if sub-standard labor 
conditions burdened the flow of interstate comnteroe and oaused 
price fluctuation. Although oonsitutionality was a less 
important issue for FLS than for the Wagner Aot, there was still 
no guarantee that, as the Nation warned, "the oourt would so 
interpret the situation" the way the framers projected. "The 
drafters of the wage and hour bill are playing a long shot"
(25).
Most businessmen refused to side with the administration. 
Their experience with the NRA oodes had left them soured for any 
kind of alignment. "As recovery developed, industry lost 
interest in the regimentation it had eagerly embraoed in 1933, 
with the result that the vast superstructure of regulation 
became unenforoable" (26). Industry had suffered the blow of 
the Wagner Aot at the hands of the Roosevelt administration and 
the New Dealers, and many were not willing to go any further 
with reforms. One businessman testified that the bill was "an
i
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unprecedented delegation of power" (27). Another oalled a 
section of the proposed bill "a perversion of Federal authority 
and an inexcusable invasion of the rights of a State" (28). The 
recovery of 1935-36 had begun to slow in 1937; and businessmen, 
already disillusioned with a soured alignment with Roosevelt, 
lost interest in New Deal methods of economic regulation.
"Qood intentions are not the only test of sound 
legislation," (29) said James Emery, the president of the 
National Association of Manufacturers, and most businessmen 
agreed. They believed national standards was an eoonomioally 
unsound polioy whioh, rather than stabilising prices, would 
oause the standard of living to fall to "a lower point that will 
be attained in an unregulated economy" (30). The bill "would 
not deoreasa unemployment. Any suoh measure is bound to 
increase oosts and prioes, and the natural effect will be to 
decrease sales" (31). One industry leader, Arthur Besse, 
president of the National Association of Wool Manufacturers, 
argued that a minimum wage would force the less productive, or 
marginal employee, to rely on relief programs. "These men are 
going to heoome unemployable, if you set a wage higher than they 
are worth based on the amount of product that they can turn out, 
and would have no alternative but to apply for relief" (32). A 
maximum work week would also lead to dire oonsequences, 
according to E. B. bane, a furniture manufacturer. "If we 
reduce the number of hours individuals oan work more rapidly 
than we increase the number of units of output per individual, 
we are bound to decrease the standard of living" 03). If
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workers were working for fewer hours and they did not inorease 
their output accordingly, they would becoae on the employer and 
the economy.
Aside from these broad economic objections, a debate opened 
up between northern and southern businessman over the issue of 
regional differentials, or whether lower standards should be set 
in the South to compensate for a lower standard of living. The 
earlier case of the Davis-Bacon Act was related to the problem 
of wage differences in the North and South, but the goal of 
Davis-Bacon was only to prevent the exploitation of looal labor 
on government oonstruetion. FL8 attempted to oorreot the whole 
problem of regional differentials and in doing so, prompted 
outories of protest. "Southerners defended low southern wages as 
the key to eventually ending southern poverty by oreating a 
broader industrial base" (34). Other sumufaotuers supported the 
argument that a legislative differential would "orystallise a 
distinction between northern and southern wage rates" (35).
Even though southern manufacturers agreed that minimum wage and 
maximum hour standards were desirable, "the great majority, 
having long deserted the partnership of the New Deal, opposed 
federal legislation." Their solution for stability was with 
voluntary agreements within the industry in "a romantic return 
to the 1920s" (36).
The leaders of labor, like the leaders of industry, did not 
present united oppostion or endorsement . VL8 beoame a 
battleground for the burgeoning rivalry between the traditional 
craft unionism of the AfL and the emerging industrial unionism
of the Committee for Industrial Organisation (CIO). The CIO had 
challenged AFL supremacy in "capturing an already existent mass 
movement of industrial vhop oommittees and rebel locals" (37) 
and rejecting the AFL’a traditional unionism. The first major 
conflicts between the two national unions had been over the 
policies of the new NLRB. The AFL accused the NLRB of favoring 
the CIO unions, and was wary of endorsing another government 
board whioh might do the same thing. One leader of the 
AFL-affiliated IBEW "oharged that the NLRB had illegally set 
itself up as the arbiter of jurisdiotional disputes, had served 
as a propaganda arm of the CIO, had conducted hearings and 
elections with partisanship, had pioked CIO officials as staff 
members and had set aside valid AFL contracts" (38).
The AFL's national leaders found themselves in an ambivalent 
position on FL8. They oould not refute the need for the 
proposed bill's provisions for minimum wages, maximum hours and 
ohild labor restrictions. The AFL had been fighting for a 
five-day, thirty-hour week sinoe 1032 when Blaok introduced a 
bill for that purpose (39). Green testified in the hearings 
that the act was "constructive legislation of far-reaohing 
signifioanoe in the publio interest, necessitated by the impaot 
of the foroes behind our industrial development and urban 
eoonomy" (40). Be knew well that the rise of automation and the 
growth of an unskilled labor force that went with it made 
protective standards necessary. He also knew that the Frealdent 
and the OXO had lamt their support, leaving the AFL awkwardly 
opposed. Nevertheless, ths soope of the', first; FL0 bill was much
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more than William Oreen thought necessary to solve the problem. 
The AFL offered support for the bill "contingent on 
congressional adoption of amendments . . whioh would limit the
power of a government wage-and-hour-fixing agency to matters 
best left to voluntary aotion or collective bargaining" (41).
The AFL was most oareful to make sure that any collective 
bargaining agreements would be insulated from labor standards 
regulation (42).
The CIO leadership! on the other hand, had few if any 
reservations about the bill. The new industrial unionism was 
more willing to aocept legislation through polioies which 
offered eoonomio stability through a strong governmental voice 
in industrial affairs (43). John Lewis, the president of the 
CIO, had some reservations about the bill (44), but he 
nevertheless "urged its enaotment and exhibited no inclination" 
to oppose it publioly (46). Be testified at the 1937 hearings 
that the bill was "virtuous and will be welcomed by every wage 
worker in America" (46). Sidney Hillman, the president of the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America and another CIO leader, 
offered more enthusiastic support for the bill than Lewis did.
He spoke from his experience in the garment, shoe and textile 
industries in which oolleotive bargaining oould not "oover the 
whole industry" (47), and labor standards were desperately 
needed to support these workers. Be believed that "to avert or 
even alleviate the eetantrephe of another depression, it is h i #  
time that we set up machinery to protect, tbs minimum-wege and 
max i w - h c n r  standards from the onslaughts of amok an eeonsmle
recession" (46).
The hearings firmly established the many regional, economio 
and political divisions whioh divided the different interested 
parties. The bill passed to Congress with the Senate divided on 
similar issues, though the opposition could only be loosely 
defined as "partly partisan, partly sectional [and] partly 
rural" (49). The New Deal ultra-liberal Democrats stood behind 
the bill, along with northern, worker-oriented Republicans
(50) . But hard-line conservatives, especially the southern 
Democrats, vehemently opposed the bill. The southern senators 
"feared the destruction of southern competitive advantages"
(51) , reflecting the views of their most powerful constituents. 
Other Senate conservatives merely did not want another New Deal 
agency (52). And Roosevelt’s ill-fated court plan to raise the 
number of Supreme Court justices did not help him to win many 
friends even among the Demoeratio senators, auoh less the 
Republicans.
With the Senate ready to do battle, the Senate Committee on 
Iducation and Labor finished their hearings and released an 
extensively revised version of the bill. In acoordanoe with AfL 
requests, the powers of the proposed board were ourbed 
drastically. The amended version offered more exemptions to 
agricultural Industries and differentials (53), whioh were 
enough "to paolfy *nny hesitant senators" (54), Roosevelt only
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Green issued his support for the committee's revised version of 
the bill. The senators knew that the bill would faoe a struggle 
in the House, and a number of Democrats were willing to aooept 
the heavily revised bill and a party truce (56). The Senate 
passed the bill in July 1937 by a vote of 56 to 26 (57) and 
promptly sent it to the House for consideration.
Sven though the opposition was strong, "most observers were 
oertain the bill would pass the House" (56). The presidential 
endorsement along with the AFL's support was considered enough 
to carry the bill. Even Business Week, no supporter of the 
bill, acknowledged, "There is no doubt that the bill will pass 
when it is brought up on the House floor" (59). But before the 
bill oould get to the floor for a vote, the House Rules 
Committee had to issue a special rule to allow it to reoeive 
oonsideration before the end of the session. The four 
Republicans and five southern Democrats overruled four northern 
Democrats and refused to release the bill (60). A petition from 
Mew Dealers tried to spark a Democratic oauous to foroe aetiea 
on the bill; but it failed beoause a number of southern 
Dmaoorats sat out the vote la the oloakroom or the hallways, aad 
there waa no quorum (61).
The manuever of a conservative ooanittee prevented the bill 
from passing in 1997. It was a turning point for the momentum 
of the Mew Deal as "many, reading together the President’s 
«*» the eeurt flan aad on fair labor standards, 
semeluded the Mew Deal was dead" (62). Xh spite of N S *  victory 
In the fag f , • ewjhliatlew at both regions) and partisan
conservative opposition soored a win in the House. This narked 
a breakdown of any alliance among House Democrats and allowed 
for further factioning in the next series of Congressional 
nanuevers. The AIL and business leaders oould lobby for their 
own initiatives, leaving the President and his supporters 
floundering to rebuild a shattered Hew Deal ooalition. The 
original initiative from the President was thwarted at every 
turn during this first round of FLS. The provisions of the bill 
prompted a particularly strong alignment of eoonomic, regional, 
partisan and politioal foes.
Round two: A Powerful Opposition Alignment
Roosevelt oalled a speoial session to begin in mid-November 
to address issues not resolved in the regular session, 
especially FLS (63). The opposition entered the speoial session 
riding on its victory in August. The conservative mood was 
anything but conciliatory, and Roosevelt was in for a battle if 
he wanted to see his legislative agenda passed. In spite of an 
enthusiastic left-wing, the crippled economy and the perception 
of a weakened presidential authority hindered the progress of 
the bill. Many Congressmen were more ooneerned with alleviating 
the effeots of the 1937 recession, and believed Roosevelt's 
programs had little direot bearing on the excels (64). As 
afc reported, "Things are different at this extra 
session— and the virus of independence seeping throu£i Congress 
affects labor legislation along with everthing else" (66). The 
House was mere divided then ever: the AFL oourted "the more
ooneervmtive labor and industrial elements;" the southerners
were still "out to defeat wage-hour Control;" and "a highly 
vocal bloc of ultra-New Deal liberals" was willing to accept the 
bill's limited scope knowing it would "at least return the 
priniciple of wage-hour legislation to the statute books" (66).
The attitudes which had been established in the first round 
were unchanged in the special session, exoept that the 
opposition coalesced more firmly. The National Association of 
Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce launched a oampaign to 
stir up southern farmers to oppose the bill (67). And the AFL 
leadership, still lobbying for its own version, did not support 
the administration's bill. The new ohair of the House labor 
oommittee, Mary Norton, again tried to wrangle the bill out of 
the olutohea of the Rules Committee, this time with a petition 
to disoharge it. She suooeeded in getting the needed 216 
signatures, though not without two weeks of intense 
politicking. Kven though the bill oleared that obstaole and 
made it to the floor, it still had to faoe a major redrafting in 
ocmsittee and a final vote. Just beoause a majority of members 
had signed the petition did not mean the bill was certain to 
pass. Many felt, like Rep. Joseph Mansfield, who was the last 
to sign the petition, "the Rules Committee's notion high-handed" 
and had the "expressed intention of voting against the bill 
later on" (68).
letthe ooafliot wfcieh most hurt the bill’s ohanoe for 
passage in the seoend round was not beoause of oonoerted effort 
frcm opposition ferae*,. The complete leek of ear coherent 
itoasuro in fewer of N e  hill weaked emir to the advantege of
the opposition. The AFL, with Green at the forefront, opposed 
the administration-supported Norton committee draft before it 
even made it to the floor. The AFL wanted a flat forty cent 
minimum and forty hour maximum work week, no regional 
differentials, and the administration of the act under one man 
already established in a government agency. Norton only 
conceded to the last demand, placing the authority of the 
administration in the Department of Labor (69). The labor 
committee accepted Norton’s bill and sent it the House over 
Green’s objections.
Norton’s compromise was the "most the AFL could hope for if 
any bill at all were to pass" (70), but Green did not want any 
bill if it were not his own. The AFL drafted a bill with their 
stipulations to be introduced in the house, but it was 
defeated. OVreen then put all his clout behind a taotic to delay 
a final vote: a vote for the hill’s recommittal baok to the 
labor oommittee for mors work (71). The House voted to recommit 
FLS, and the bill suffered its second major defeat. This time 
the defeat was brought on by a rivalry between those who did 
want national labor standards.
The conservatives, in staying out of the fracas, gained 
considerable power over their divided opponents. During the 
special session, they "sat baok in satisfaction, knowing that 
they could throw their strength in such a way to defeat [either 
of] the bills (72). Roosevelt, beleaguered, though willing to 
fight at the beginning of the session, seemed utterly defeated 
at the end on all counts. The court bill defeat, along with a
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rise in aitdown strikes and relief problems, the deepening 
recession, and now FLS were blows to his prestige. He did not 
use his personal pressure to unite any kind of coalition, but 
allowed warring factions to crush the bill. Without a 
Roosevelt-led Democratic coalition, Congress oould vote as they 
please, and they did (73). The special session Roosevelt had 
called with high expectations ended in disaster. The opposition 
gained its strength more from the disunity of the support for 
FLS than their own unity.
Round Three: Roosevelt’s Victory
The FLS bill finally was successful on its third run through 
Congress. The success was primarily the result of a concerted 
and oonoentrated effort from the administration to get the bill 
passed. From the perspective of industry leaders, Roosevelt had 
little power left to bargain with, however. At the opening of 
the 1036 session, not only were industry leaders still 
vehemently opposed to FLS, but they were confident it would 
never pass. The Chamber of Cosneroe issued a diatribe against 
the bill (74). Even well into the session, 8u«taM« Vmmh 
gleefully reported: the "the President seems to have lost his 
power over Congress. Whatever his Intentions may have been, his 
method was to destroy our economy and substitute for it one more 
to his liking . . . .  It would seem that era has ended" (75). 
Even other observations showed Roosevelt "beset by difficulties, 
both within and without his party . . . .  A man whose strength 
has always rested on his politioal adroitness and flexibility 
has— as a result os' the barrage directed against him— grown
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harder and more rigid in his resistance to his enemies" '77).
In spite of these negative assessments of Roosevelt’s 
capabilities, he began in January 1936 to work in earnest for 
national cooperation. His State of the Union address called for 
a united purpose from industry, agriculture, business, and in 
politios "to do their utmost to cooperate with the 
government--in whatever program may be sanctioned by the chosen 
Representatives of the people" (77).
Roosevelt called for major overhauls on the bill. He 
decided it was too long and complex, and he gave it to Perkins 
and the labor department to pare down. FDR had his 
administrative aide, Rufus Poole, start a canvass of 
Congressional attitudes to see whom he con'd target. Poole 
decided the only way to break the deadlook would be for the 
administration to support the AFL draft and to improve it in 
conference committee (78). A new draft of the bill gave in to 
most of the AFL demands. There were no regional differentials, 
and the administration of the act was given to the Secretary of 
Labor (79). With the AFL leaderahip happy and supportive, a 
nationwide drive was launohed in support of labor standards.
The third house ooamittee bill, with its considerable 
concessions to the AFL, had the support of the majority of the 
labor ooamittee (80). A minority bill, written by Rep. Robert 
Ramspeok of Georgia, challenged the majority and offered 
regional differentials and an easy passage through the Rules 
Committee. The Ramsmaek bill's "shining merit mis that it was 
delioately calculated to go through the Rouse Rules Committee,
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and through the House itself, with the least possible fuss1'
(81). Though it did pass through the Rules Committee, the labor 
committee voted it down, afraid a labor bill without AFL support 
could not pass. The majority bill was sent to the House, but 
onoe again, the Rules Committee held it up.
To gauge Congressional support, Roosevelt met personally 
with the Senate's majority leader and floor leader, two powerful 
southern Democrats. He hoped to gain their endorsement of the 
bill but was unable to sway them. Roosevelt sent them a letter, 
whioh Morton soon made public, to try to diffuse some of the 
hostility which had surrounded him: that he was brittle,
dictatorial and unwilling to compromise. Roosevelt's 
semi-publio plea for unity galvanised about fifty liberals to 
battle for the bill. Labor, with AFL machinery in gear, was now 
in full agreement on the bill and "pointed out to 
election-facing Congressmen the aise of the labor vote in their 
respective distriots" (82). Roosevelt aides gave money and 
endorsements to a rabid Mew-Dealer, Claude Pepper, who was 
campaigning for a Florida seat in the Senate. Pepper targeted 
labor standards as his prime goal, and he won his primary by a 
oonsiderable margin. Pepper tapped a southern sentiment on the 
bill different from what conservatives had been professing 
(83). Popular support took off for fair labor standards, and a 
Callup poll in May 1938 indioated 69 percent of the oountry in 
favor of IL8 . In a regional breakdown in the poll, 68 peroent 
of the South favored it; and the lowest regional support was 
split fifty/fifty in -he West Central states. (84).
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The Florida primary tipped off a number of Congressmen to 
the nationwide support for the biil. That, along with the AFL’s 
endorsement for the revised bill, prompted a mad stampede to 
sign the petition to discharge the bill from the Rules Committee 
(85). When Norton submitted the petition this session, it was 
signed in two-and-a-half hours, with other representatives still 
waiting in line. Ramspeok’s minority bill went to the house in 
spite of the labor oommittee's refusal to indorse. The house 
defeated it, and prooeeded to pass the Norton bill with an 
overwhelming vote of 314 to 97. The debate produoed some 
amendments whioh provided for more agrioultural exemptions, and 
oompletely exempted the retail industries (86). So the bill had 
passed the House, riding on a wave of an administrative blits, 
national support, and finally a united labor front.
The FLSA had yet one more step: a conference oonaittee had
to be named to reoonoile the huge differences between the bill 
that had passed the Senate the year before and the bill whioh 
had just passed the House. All groups, from organised labor to 
liberals to southern conservatives, wanted their voioes heard on
this oomnlttee. The ohief objeots of debate were “the questions 
of possible regional differentials, of flexible versus
inflexible standards, and of the best administrative agenoles
and procedures to set up" (67). The Joint committee produced a 
oonpraslse that granted the AFL's request' for. flat waif and hour 
shales,but placed thaw on a graduated system which would work 
■up ;tO' the forty oast, .forty hour requirements in a numbsr: of 
Fmati < H ) . . The House and lunate approved the. oonferamce
'  1‘, A1-OJ& Jar-'W is .
report, but "the law was a tissue of compromises made to appease 
a formidable ooalition of opponents" (89). Many businessmen 
were pleased with the exemptions given to retail workers; 
agrioulture Interests were happy with farm worker exemptions.
The South got a delayed introduction of flat standards; a 
gradual five-year move would prevent the 40 oent, 40 hour 
provision from affecting them until 1940. And the AFL oertainly 
came out on top with almost all its provisions: no
differentials, no labor board, and the forty oent, forty hour 
law.
Roosevelt oame out best of all, ultimately viotoriou. and on 
the top of the political heap. Bis "political sense, despite 
the massive opposition, was unerring. The law was extremely 
popular.” A Gallup poll of January 1, 1939, showed 71 percent 
in favor of FLSA; and even more shooking, 89 percent of the 
South and 86 percent of employers across the country were in 
favor of it (90). The conservative ooalitloa that had been so
effective in stopping the bill in the earlier two rounds had *,! *
orumbled. "Whenever conservatives feoed no potent pressure 
groups . . . they banded together and carried enough Hew Dealers 
to win. Otherwise, as [with] labor standards, they slid into 
factionalism almost from the start" (98).
The policy of the administration had Called at the cutset, 
■eoeevelt hndaotespeoted such opposition, but he certainly got
sb vy w#e m  > ^pnppe "Upty^puswep^n : d>j|pnsnyp ^^ p.iptpwHWHPwvtm^s ■
Jaanwft - mMaSsiMl^ iweed* dtamwMnk ISsaearnica Plhkay^a  ^ ^W W  •fMHPik wppii m W m W W m  nvilM * , * , tpjrPwltp Wmm: ;
l«bor divided; ani M e  AFL, slang with the rest of' the
opposition, offactively prevented legislation it did not favor. 
The turning point oame with Roosevelt's decision to work with 
the AFL. Once those in favor of standards united behind a bill, 
the opposition oould not sustain itself. The AFL had come a 
long way since from its silent, though supportive, position on 
the Wagner Aot. The Fair Labor Standards Act showed more than a 
reoeptive government; it was a pliable one whioh oonoeded to 
powerful foroes outside it.
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CONCLUSION
The Devis-Bacon Act, the Wagner Act, and the Fair Labor 
Standards Act are three cases which show different avenues for 
the passage of labor legislation. In each case, the aain 
actors— broadly, labor, business and governaent--interacted to 
oreate an environaent in which that specirio legislation could 
get through. They did not necessarily work together to produoe 
labor reform, nor did the different factions within these groups 
unite on all issues. But their aotions, combined with oertain 
economic and political forces worked to produce these three 
labor laws.
Using these laws to gauge labor’s power in a national forum 
shows a gradually improved ability to affeot the provisions of a 
bill, though also greater factioning on s national level. 
Beginning with Davis-Bacon, admittedly a small refora, the labor 
movement was weak and willing to aooapt whatever reform 
available. Unio is surprisingly showed little enthusiasa for
Davis-Baoon; but a consensus among both national leaders, such 
as H.J. MoDonough, John Frey and William Green, and union
publications, was favorable to the law. They agreed that the 
conoept of bootleg labor was abhorrent to their principles, and 
they had hoped for a law which would regulate the construction 
industry pore than the provisions of the 1991 law did.
The Wegner Act presents a more oompleg issue, and one with 
far mere iapliogtiens then Davis-ZJaoon had or will ever have, 
ly liM, union membership had drown atrsafer and more violent in 
lbj:»ljgh,.lnp recognition, and the VlAA’s provision for
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collective bargaining promoted a drive for union organisation. 
The large number of unionised workers forced a recognition of 
the need for some legislation* though not all people aooepted 
the fairly radical conoept of enforced collective bargaining.
In spite of some other evaluations of union support, the AFL 
gave no indication that it did not fully endorse and support the 
initiatives of the Wagner bill. Their support, however, was not 
equivalent to their input; and although the AFL pledged support, 
it did not have much of a hand in the conception or the language 
of the Wagner Act.
As soon as the CIO split from the AFL, conflicts began over 
the NLRB’s administration of the Wagner Aot. The division on 
the national level between the AFL’s craft unionism and the 
CIO’s industrial unionism spilled over to the prooess of the 
Fair Labor Standards Aot. The labor movement divided on the
issue of possibly another board to regulate labor; the A H  
leadership was sat against the oonoept of another governmental 
regulatory body which night discriminate against them. The CIO 
was generally «K>?e satisfied with the FL8 bill in its original 
form.
The discontent from the AFL was highly influential for 
reasons related to divisions in Congressional alignments. Steen 
was able in the 111? special session to prevent the bill from 
ooming to a vote* had in 1910, the AFL’a endorsement wes 
aourted to geia • consensus among liberals in the louse of 
Ropewagntmtivos. With FL8A, the d9t« wns able to frame the bill 
, be ;ite afeolt leftists, n feet oerteinly impossible with either
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of the first two cases.
If labor had some success with legislation favoring it, then 
industrial interests were at the other end. Bven Davis-Baoon, a 
fairly innocuous and unassuming law, did not veoeive a grand 
endorsement from construction industry leaders. Most supported 
the principles of Davis-Bacon while decrying the invasion of 
government into private affairs. Some businessmen did lend 
their suppv.j.t to the bill; and in spite of their protests, the 
law finally did not antagonise them to any great extent. The 
close alignment of business to the Hoover administration 
prevented Davis-Bacon from hindering the industry too much.
The Wagner Aot provoked business leaders from its very 
beginnings, but unlike four years earlier with Davis-Bacon, the 
country’s industrisl leadership had little voice in the 
prooess. The collapse of their administrative capabilities with 
the MBA downgraded their statute ih presuming economic 
recovery. Businessmen in 1|3B had far fewer allies in Congress 
than did their labor rivals. And in spits of a protracted and 
vicious campaign against the Wagtier Act, the leaders ot the 
nation’s businesses were powerless to stop it. They were shut 
out of the prooess, muoh more so than labor, siaoe the Wagner
Aot was a bill at least designed to promote labor rights.
the FLiA mas alaaist a triumph far businessmen, though their 
lobby agmiaat this bill was leas of a oonsensus effort than la
the other eases. A number of representatives of the industry 
objected be She bill boosuss ther felt it wee eeoaomioally 
nmsiwied, emd the prlmelplee that the framers eapeuaed mould
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deepen th< aion already threatening the country. But the
split bet' ^rthera and southern business presented perhaps
t.’ e most < a division. Southern industries had the
advantage loner labor costs and thus loner production
costs. A national wage and hour standard would harm the 
economic structure of the southern wage scale. Southerners 
wanted wage differentials; but northern businessmen argued that 
the South already had an unfair advantage, and that it should be 
remedied with the same standards for the vhole country. The 
full-fledged conservative opposition to any kind of labor 
standards legislation seemed to be winning up until the support 
for the bill grew more cohesive. For a period during the FLS 
process, businessmen seemed to have more allies in the 
government; but the administration's mammoth efforts in 1938 
shut down all opposition.
Perhaps tho most important ingredient in these cases was the 
receptiveness of the government to the proposed labor reform. 
Without some kind of support from an area within the government, 
none of the laws aould have passed. Davis-Bacon, though 
conceived by an irate Congressman Bacon to defend his distriot 
from outside contractors, fell in line with the Hoover 
administration’s ideology about wages and the construction 
industry. Hoover’s deputies from the departments most involved 
in federal construction wrote a bill to fit their own 
specifications. Their bill did not do a whole lot; but it did 
defend the principle that the government should be the ideal 
employer, end not exploit workers on its own projects.
77
The Wagnor bill, unlike either Davis-Baoon or FLSA, worked 
outside the administration under the direction of Robert Wagner,
a liberal orusader. The Congress was filled with liberal 
crusaders in 1935 who were sensitive to the needs of the growing 
force of organised labor, and the Wagner Act’s passage can be 
credited to their determination. There was also a talented 
staff of lawyers writing the bill, keeping the problems of the 
NRA in mind, and trying to disarm the question of 
constitutionality. On top of all that, New Deal legislation had 
slowed after the Supreme Court invalidated the NRA, and the 
Wagner Act filled a gap. The conservative opposition to the 
Wagner Act, though considerable especially in the Senate, was 
simply out of power. The bloc of liberal Senators, with Wagner 
in the lead, could pa&s the bill without conservative 
endorsement, aud even without Roosevelt’s endorsement.
As with labor and business attitudes on the FLSA, the 
government from the administration to the factions in the 
Congress contradicted one another fro* tie start. The 
conservatives lined up against the bill. Southern Democrats 
strayed from partisanship to be loyal to their region, or more 
accurately to the industry ir, their region. Labor advocates 
split their support between the AFL and their own conception of 
the right kind of labor standards bill. And strangely,
Roosevelt presented the bill originally as one of his 
administration's reforms, yet he was unable to build a ooalition 
of votes until a year after the bill was introduced. The 
tried-and-true conservatives were successful only because those
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who would have wanted a bill fought bitterly over what kind of 
bill it would be. The President broke the deadlock by granting 
concessions to William Green and having the labor committee 
formulate a new bill. He also jumped on the publicity wagon and 
began a nationwide call for labor standards legislation. The 
nation responded overwhelmingly, and the House of 
Representatives reflected that response. The FLSA bill passed, 
though only by itcorporating the provisions of many different 
factions.
In the first two cases, Davis-Bacon and the Wagner Act, a 
problem with labor was presented to the government, and the 
government worked within itself to find a solution. The 
Davis-Bacon Act was framed by a small group of high-level 
administration officials to respond to the problem of wage 
undercutting. Perhaps a group more representative was 
responsible for the Wagner Aot. They were sympathetic to a 
need for suoh legislation. In neither of these two oases did 
the governmental group in oontrol give much consideration to 
suggestions from outside. And both labor and business acoepted 
the laws as written. The prooess of TL8A shows a much different 
direction, however. The government was responsive to both the 
requests of a powerful labor lobby from the AfL, and to a public 
endorsement of the bill. The Bouse of Representatives in 
partloular was susceptible to that kind of pressure from publio 
opinion.
The determination of those among the group in government in 
the ablest position to promote a bill--whether it was Hoover’s
' ' v- : ; . '
: - , \  .. . ■ : . . j
' ii i t . :v , . ,v. ° , .-,-j ■. * ' ..-v; fal. ■■■■»• ■ ■ ■
conservative administrators, liberal Congressmen, or a Roosevelt 
ooalition— was the decisive factor. This oonoept draws together 
the various administrative, political and economic issues that 
surrounded these bills. The government, referring to the 
strongest faction in ear*h case, could turn an issue to its 
advantage. Hoover's men used their oomplete monopoly on the 
government's administrative power to pass their version of 
Oavis-Bacon. Wagner and his cohorts used a similar method, 
though it was tied to more complicated reasons. And with FL8A, 
Roosevelt finally recognised the need to align with the AFL; and 
he used his political txills to generate support.
These bills do show some progression to a different kind of 
forum in the federal government. The Wagner Act was a response 
to a problem of national import; it was meant to alleviate the 
tensions of the workplace to allow workers to gain strength in 
unity. The prooess of the FLSA showed what kind of affeot the 
Wagner Act had: the AFL had gained a stature that allowed it to
mold provisions of the law. The impaot of public opinion on the 
House showed an even greater reoeptiveness among Congressmen to 
listen to constituents other than the conventionally entrenched 
industrial interests. From Davis-Bacon to the Wegner Aot to the 
Fair Labor Standards Aot, the politloal implications of 
legislative labor reform had expanded.
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